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(i) Introduction 
In this chapter, we shall present the basic ideas and methodologies of a set of 
contemporary contributions which we shall group under the general heading of 
"evolutionary economics" (a more precise definition of what we mean will be given 
shortly). We shall illustrate some achievements -- especially with regards to the analysis 
of technological change and economic dynamics --, discuss some unresolved issues, and flag 
a few promising topics of research. 
There are signs that evolutionary analysis and models may be making a comeback 
in economics. Just over the last decade, the book by Nelson and Winter (1982) has been 
followed by several other works also exploring evolutionary theory in economics (among 
others, Dosi, Freeman, Nelson, Silverberg and Soete (1988), Saviotti and Metcalfe (1991), 
Anderson, Arrow and Pines (1989), Day and Eliasson (1986)) Winter (1984) and (1987), 
Witt (1992), De Bresson (1988)) Langlois and Everett (1992)) Metcalfe (1992), Stiglitz 
(1992). A new Journal of Evolutionary Economics has been founded and several other 
new ones have advertised their interest in evolutionary analyses. In fact, evolutionary 
arguments are not at all new in economics. They go back at least to ~ a l t h u s '  and Marx 
and appear also among economists who have otherwise contributed to equilibrium theories: 
for example one often cites Alfred Marshall on "the mecca of economics [lying] in economic 
biology rather than economic mechanics" (Marshall (1948, p. xiv); and also the "as ... if' 
argument by Milton Fnedman (1953) can be considered the most rudimentary use of an 
evolutionary point of view in order to justify the assumptions of e q u i l i b r i ~ ~  and 
rationality. In addition, of course scholars like Veblen, von Hayek and, even more so, 
- - 
For a recent reappraisal of Malthus as an  "evolutionary economist," cf. von Tunzelmann (1992). 
Schumpeter, have anticipated many of the ideas that contemporary evolutionary economists 
are struggling with.* 
However, the wave of current evolutionary theorizing is probably fostered by several 
convergent factors. There is certainly a growing reco,etion of the difficulties that 
equilibrium theories which presume perfectly rational agents face in interpreting wide 
arrays of economic phenomena --  ranging from the generation of technological change all 
the way to the diversity of long-term patterns of growth. But, of course, we know from 
the history of science that anomalies and falsifications alone are not sufficient to spur 
alternative theories. In addition, a rich empirical literature, concerning the nature of the 
processes of innovation and the institutions supporting them, to a good extent inspired by 
evolutionary ideas, has shown that an evolutionary theoretical perspective can provide 
useful heuristics for applied research. Not only that: the empirical work has suggested 
fruitful inductive generalizations and taxonomies from which evolurionary theories can 
draw behavioral assumptions and "stylized factsaV3 Finally, the development of quite 
general formal machineries able to account for the properties of dynamical systems 
displaying various forms of non-linearhies increasingly allows rigorous analytical treatments 
of evolurionary proce~ses .~ This, together with the possibility of computer implementations 
of formal pedankenexperiment concerning diverse "artificial economies" (Lane (1992)), 
For discussions of the role of evolutionary ideas in the history of economic thought, see Hodgson 
(forthcoming) and Clark and Juma (1988). 
On the economics of innovation, cf. Freeman (1982) and Dosi (1988). 
More detailed surveys and discussions of economic applications are in Silverberg (1988) ma Dosi and 
Kz~iovski (1993). For a general appraisal, Nicolis and Prigogine (1989), and for economic zppiicario~s, 
Rosser (1991). 
holds the promise of establishing also formally sound bases for evolutionary analyses of 
economic change. 
(ii) Evolutionarv Theory: General Principles 
One way to try to define evolutionary theory in general would be to stan from 
biology, where evolutionary theory is best worked out, and explore where one can find 
close analogies to the variables and concepts of that theory in other areas of inquiw -- in 
this case economics. However, we think it more fruitful to start with the general, and then 
examine applications in specific areas -- like biology or economics - -  as special cases. 
Most scholars interested in this issue -- be they from biology, economics, sociology, 
or whatever -- would agree that the term "evolutionary" ought to be reserved for theories 
about dynamic time paths, that is ones that aim to explain how things change over time, 
or to explain why things are what they are in a manner that places weight on "ho~v they 
got there." The more controversial question is which of such theories ought to be called 
evolutionary. Until recently most scholars would have probably ruled out theories t let  are 
whole deterministic. There would seem no point in saying that Kepler's laws of plmetary 
motion, together with Newton's gravitational theory that explains them, define an 
evolutionary system. Neither would it seem useful to regard as evolutionary the execution 
of a detailed plan for the construction of a building, or any realization of a prespecified 
blueprint. Similarly, theories of economics change that analyze that process as one of 
moving competitive equilibrium -- as is the case in neoclassical growth theory -- shodd not 
be regarded as an "evolutionary" theory. 
Recent advances in the understanding of non-linear (but deterministic) systems have 
highlighted the richness of the dynamics that they may engender, involving, among other 
things, the possibility of sudden discontinuities in systems' morphology, sensitive history- 
dependence of the processes and the unpredictable emergence of "novelties" akin to those 
traditionally associated with stochastic perturbations.' However, we shall cover here only 
a small portion of non-linear dynamics models. Although evolutionary dynamics generally 
imply non-linearities, the converse is not true: non-linearities are not sufficient to 
determine that a system is "evolving." 
At the opposite extreme, it does not seem to add anything to call "evolu~onarq-" 
theories where all of the action is "random," as certain models in economics which purport 
that within an industry the growth or decline of particular firms is a random vaiable, 
possibly related to the size of the firm at any time, but otherwise not analyzable. One can 
trace through the random processes built into such models and predict the distribution of 
f m s  sizes at any time, for example that under certain specifications it will asymptotically 
become log normal. But there does not seem much intellectual value here in sayi?,o that 
under this model the distribution of fm "evolves." Implicitly, then, our archerype of 
"evolutionary" models contains both systematic and random elements (or, possibly, "quasi- 
random," such as in those cases whereby innovation are generated by some complex 
underlying non-lineanties that display stochastic features to a finite observer). For 
example, in biological evolutionary theory the random elements are generally associated 
with the generation or preservation of variety in a species and the systematic oces with 
- - 
The presence of chaotic attractors is a case to the point. 
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selection pressures, and useful extension of the term evolutionary to other areas would 
appear to require something analogous. 
But then revise the building construction story as follows. Assume that the original 
home design is a tentative one, because the builder is not exactly sure how to achieve what 
he wants, and thus the plan initially contains certain elements without any firm 
commitment to them, indeed that are there partly by chance. As the building gets 
constructed the builder gets a better idea of what the present plans imply, and where the 
original design is inadequate, and revises the plan and the path of construction accordingly. 
Revise the firm growth model as follows. Assume that the f m s  differ in certain 
identifiable characteristics, and growth of those with certain ones turns out to be 
systematically greater than those that lack these. The industry gradually develops a 
structure in which only firms with these characteristics survive. 
Both models now contain both random and systematic elements. Further, in both 
the systematic ones act in a sense by winnowing on the random ones. In the house design 
case, design elements turn out to please or displease the builder, and are accepted or 
rejected accordingly. In the industry evolution case, the "market" or something is selecting 
a certain number of firms that have certain attributes. A limitation of both stories is that 
neither is explicit about what it is that seems to give advantage. But both give hope that 
the analyst might be able to find out. Perhaps it is "cost per square foot" or "nice outlooks" 
or some combination that explains why the builder revises his design as the information 
comes in. Perhaps it is production costs or ability to innovate that is determining whether 
firms thrive or fail. 
The analytic structure of these two examples is reminiscent of that of evolutionary 
theory in biology, without being clones of it. There are random elements in the process 
that generate or are associated with variation. There are systematic elements which are 
associated with tvinnotving or focussing. 
The latter example is more conformable with evolutionary theory in biology because 
it refers to an actual population of things, while the former example does not appear to, 
at least at first glance. In biology the use of the term evolutionary nowadays is firmly 
associated with analysis of actual populations of things. An embryo, or a living creature 
more generally, is described as developing, not evolving. In part this use of language 
reflects a predilection discussed earlier -- that change "according to a plan" is usually not 
regarded as evolurionary. However, it is widely recognized that many random occurences 
tvill affect the development of an embryo or a tree. The prejudice against using the term 
"evolutionary" to describe such biological processes stems from the fact that the tern has 
been preempted for use in describing another class of biological phenomena. However, it 
is not clear that such prejudice should carry over outside of biology. 
Consider our house builder, or an individual learning to play chess, or a firm trying 
to find a strategy for survival in a competitive industry. Our house builder can be regzrded 
as having in his head a number of plan variants, or perhaps as having one initially in mind 
but being aware that there are a set of possible changes that might turn out to be 
desirable. Similarly the chess player or the firm. If firms, persons learning to play chess, 
or housebuilders, learn from experience and winnow or adapt their plans or strategies or 
behaviors, is it unreasonable to think of these as evolving? In reflecting on this one might 
recognize that the learning, or adaptation, can be modeled in terms of a change in the 
probability distribution of possible actions that entity might take at any time, and the 
discovery of new ones, corning about as a result of feedback from what has been tried, and 
the consequences. In fact, these "learning" dynamics may well turn out to have a form 
similar to those which describe the evolution of populations or the evolutionary changes 
in the internal structures of phenotypes (Holland et al. (1986), Fontana and Buss (1992)). 
Can one regard technology as evolving, or science, or law? One certainly can regard 
the state of these entities at any time as comprising a set of variants that are actually 
operative in particular contexts. Thus, different firms maybe producing and trying to sell 
profitably products of somewhat different designs. Different scientists (or technologists) 
may be working with different hypotheses regarding what is the best way to understand 
a particular matter (or design a particular artifact). Thus, technology, or science, or the 
l a~v  for that matter, can be treated as an evolving population of "things." 
In very general terms, we use the term "evolutionary" to define a class of theories, 
or models, or arguments, that have the following characteristics. First, their purpose is to 
explain the movement of something over time, or to explain why that something is what 
it is at a moment in time in terms of how it got there; that is, the analysis is expressly 
dynamic. Second, the explanation involves both random elements which generate or renew 
some variation in the variables in question, and mechanisms that systematically winnow 
on extant variation. Evolutionary models in the social domain involve some processes of 
imperfect (mistake-ridden) learning and discovery, on the one hand, and some selection 
mechanism, on the other. 
The variation in the theory can be associated with an actual variety which exists at 
any time -- as a distribution of genotypes or phenotypes, or firm policies. Alternately, it 
may characterize a set of potential values of a variable, only one of which is manifest at 
any time. 
The characterization of systematic winnotling forces must be set up so that one can 
explain what thrives and what does not in terms of something like relative fitness. The 
theory should include a specification both of the determinants of "fitness," and of the 
manner in which relative fitness "selects" in the sense above. This is meant to rule out 
arguments of the sort that something must be fit in some way simply because it exists. It  
limits the domain of evolutionary theorizing to subject matter where fitness can be 
assigned plausible meaning, and where selection mechanisms can be specified in some 
detail. Of course, this does not exclude at all the possibility that "fitness" criteria 
themselves change in the course of evolution. Indeed, this happens in biology (such as in 
those cases which are sometimes referred to as "hyperselection" and "co-evolution") and, 
even more so, one should expect it to happen in social evolution. Hoivever, an 
evolutionary theory, k order to retain interpretative power, ought to be able to specify at 
least some general characteristics of the process by which selection mechanisms change 
over time. 
More generally, and more technically, it must be emphasized that the unequivocal 
identification of the variables upon which selection operates is not sufficient to establish 
the proposition that the frequency of the "fitter" populations (or characters) monotonically 
increases as evolution unfolds. In fact, this is shown to apply only under panicular 
restrictions on the mechanisms governing the dynamics, such as continuity and linearity 
of the function driving the change in relative frequencies (for discussions, cf. Silverberg 
(1988) and Dosi and Kaniovski (1993)). 
Note also that in our definition of evolutionary theories there is nothing which 
amounts to particular hypotheses on the rates of change (either in the generation of 
variants or in change of the states which the system explores): that is "evolution" is by no 
means opposed to "revolution." It is also consistent with abrupt changes and major 
discontinuities in the structure of the systems under consideration. Neither does it involve 
specific restrictions on the nature of the stochastic processes driving the generarion of 
novelty. For example, evolutionary models of social and economic change -- unlike 
biological models -- generally involve purposeful learning procedures by individual agents, 
whose outcomes can be thereafter replicated and diffused both via environmental selection 
and via observation and imitation by other agents.6 
If one can understand the determinants of "fitness", and one observes that certain 
things survive and others do not, one has at least a beginning of an explanation. However, 
the latter implies the identification of the unit of selection, and the mechanisms through 
which selection operates. At this level, as Silverberg (1988) emphasizes, simple reasoning 
by analogy might not take one very far. In order to highlight some differences as well as 
similarities across disciplines let us briefly compare evolutionary theories in biology with 
some instances in social sciences. 
Incidentally, note that even in biology the beliefs of no genetic-level learning and "blir.C;,essn of 
mutarion have been recently challenged by a few scholars; see Rennie (1993). 
(iii) Evolutionarv Theories: From Biolom to Social Disci~lines 
Evolutionary theory in biology is in flux, and there is far from full agreement on 
certain matters among modem biologists, ethnologists, paleontologists, and other scientists 
concerned with the subject. However, the following sketch possibly captures that part of 
the generally agreed upon core that is useful to lay out for our purposes in this paper, as 
well as some of the relevant bones of contention.' 
The theory is concerned with two actual populations as contrasted with potential 
ones. One is the population of genotypes, defined as the genetic inheritance of liking 
creatures. The second is the population of phenotypes, defined in terms of a set of 
variables that happen to be of interest to the analyst, but which include those that 
influence the "fitness" of each living creature. These might include physical aspects like 
size, or sight, behavioral patterns like song, or responses to particular contingencies like 
something that can be eaten and is within reach, or a potential mate, or a member of one's 
own "group" soliciting help. 
Phenotypic characteristics are presumed to be influenced by genotypic ones, but not 
uniquely determined by them. Modem evolutionary theory recognizes that the 
development of a living creature from its origins to its phenotypic characteristics at any 
time can be influenced by the environment it passes through. Modem evolutionary theory 
also recognizes a variety of learning experiences which shape the behavior of a phenotype, 
including how it was taught by its mother, whether particular behaviors later in life were 
rewarded, etc. However, if we hold off for a moment considering evolutionary theory that 
' The following draws from many sources. A good summary can be found in Durham (1991); see also 
:!ridge and Gould (1972) and Gould (1985). 
recognizes "culture" as something that can be transferred across generations, the hallmark 
of standard biological evolutionary theory is that only the genes, not any acquired 
characteristics or behavior, get passed on across the generations. 
The notion of "generations" is basic to biological evolutionary theory. The 
phenotypes get born, live, reproduce (at least some of them do), and die (all of them do). 
On the other hand, the genes get carried over to their offspring, who follow the same 
generational lifecycle. Thus, the genes provide the continuity of the evolutionary system, 
with the actual living creatures acting, from one point of view, as their transporters from 
generation to generation. For species that reproduce this way, bisexuality provides a 
mechanism whereby new genotypes can be created. Mutations do as well. But the 
emphasis in most treatments of biological evolutionary theory is on differential 
reproduction of phenotypes which augments the relative genetic frequency of the more 
successful reproducers and diminishes that of the less. 
In the generally held interpretation of this theory (there are other or more complex 
interpretations as well), selection operates directly on the phenotypes. It is they, not their 
genes per se, that are more or less fit. To repeat what was stressed above, phenonpes are 
not uniquely determined by genotypes. However, the theory assumes a strong enough 
relationship between genotypes and phenotypes so that systematic selection on phexotypes 
results in systematic selection on genotypes. 
There are several controversial, or at least open, aspects of this theory that are 
germane to our discussion here. One of them is whether, and if so in what sense, 
evolution can be understood to "optimize" fitness. Note that this discussion presumes that 
there are some fitness characteristics that evolution systematically selects on. 
Assume for the moment that evolution does systematically select on certain fitness 
characteristics. From that presumption, a number of evolutionary theorists argue that 
evolution in fact optimizes, in a particular sense. The concept of an evolutionarily stable 
strategy (ESS) commonly employed in the literature is general enough to encompass 
situations where a unique bundle of phenotypical characteristics drives out all others, and 
ones in which what survives is a mix of different phenotypes. (See, e.g., Maynard Smith, 
1982.) The concept of "stratedl in these models is broad enough to encompass any 
phenotypic characteristic that matters for survival, and the strategies that sunive are 
"optimal" just in the sense that they best other strateses that they encounter in the survival 
game. 
Note that the proposition that evolution "optimizes" in this sense carries absolutely 
no connotation of species optimality. Nothing at al assures "Pareto optimality." All 
members of the species might do better if all changed in certain ways. Rather, the 
optimizing concept is chat each individual is designed to assure its greatest possible fitness, 
oiven the design of the other individuals and the surrounding environment. 0 
Not all theorists of biological evolution buy into all of this. Some argue that rhere 
are sometimes strong forces selecting at the level of the group, rather than at the level of 
the individual. Later when we consider selection in economic analysis, the question of the 
nature and strength of mechanisms of selection will be a prominent concern. 
For our purpose here, however, let us consider especially the controversy of whether 
ir is plausible to think of evolution as optimizing, either at the individual or group lev?!. 
,411 evolutionary theorists admit that mutation involves major elements of chance. W i l e  
in biology most mutations diminish fitness or are neutral, some obviously have enhanced 
it. However, it is apparent that phenotypes need to be understood as systems of genes and 
associated characteristics which interact in determining fitness. Thus, whether a particular 
mutation is helpful or neutral or lethal is a function of the rest of the system that mutation 
modifies in some way. Thus, even if evolution can be regarded as optimizing fitness, the 
optimum is very local and likely poor stuff compared to what inight have been. 
An even more fundamental argument is that those that propose evolution optin-izes 
fitness presume a relatively stringent and constant selection environment. But selection 
pressures often are not particularly severe, or discriminating. Thus the "random" element 
in evolution lies not just in mutation (and cross breeding) but also in the determination 
of what survives and what does not, which may have little to do with any basic "fitness" 
qualities, except for eliminating gross misfits. Further, even when selection pressures are 
stringent, they generally reflect the particularities of a situation -- the nature of the extant 
food supply, the predator population, etc. -- which may not be a constant. Thus the 
distribution of genotypes extant today may be strongly shaped by those that survived in 
a very different environment some time ago, and the offspring they had, as well as 
yesterday's winnowing on the group extant then. The notion of ESS is indeed a sratic 
concept which neglects any explicit account of the process driving to the purported 
equilibria (Silverberg (1 988)). Moreover, even when embedded into a dynamic process, 
the notion of ESS rests on the idea that the changes in the factors which influence "fitness" 
and selection (i.e., changes in the payoff matrix) are much slower than, and independent 
from, adjustments to any given structure of payoffs. 
A related argument focusses on the continuing nature of evolution. To the extent 
that mutation continues and some of the mutations enhance fitness, what meaning is there 
to the proposition that what one observes at any time is optimal? 
Note the similarity of the arguments here to those we considered earlier, about 
whether competition assures "optimum" behavior. We shall meet these questions again 
later. 
As indicated, animal behavior has been, for a long time, a "phenorype" characreristic 
of interest to evolutionary theorists. That behavior often involves, in an essential Lvay, 
modes of interaction with fellow members of one's species. Over the last thirty years an 
important subdiscipline has gro~yn up concerned with exactly these kinds of social beha~ior 
patterns. Much of rhis has been concerned with nonprirnate animals -- insect colonies, bird 
families and flocks, etc. A sizeable portion of it has been, however, concerned ~virh 
humans. The part of rhe sociobiology literature concerned with nonhumans reco,dzes rhat 
learned behavior can be passed down from generation to generarion, but in general has 
presumed, first, that the particular capabiliries to learn and to transmit to offspring are tied 
to genes, and second, that the "learning" does not not progress from generarion KO 
generation. To the extent that these behaviors enhance fitness, there is selection on the 
genes that facilitate them, according to the arguments sketched above. Bur learned 
behavior in these theories does not follow a cross generational path of irs own. 
Conversely, significant amendments to the theory are required whenever one acknowledges 
explicit mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of learned behaviors -- as it is 
plausibly the case at least in the socio-economic domain.' 
Clearly, we are not in a position to argue in favor of a particular biological theory. 
For our purpose here it suffices to point out that, at least in principle, the theory identifies 
(i) a fundamental unit of selection (the genes); (ii) a mechanism linking the genotypic 
level with the entities (the phenotypes) which actually undergo environmental selection; 
(iii) some processes of interaction, yielding the selection dynamics; and, finally, (iv) some 
mechanisms generating variations in the population of genotypes and, through that, among 
phenotypes. 
It is quite straightforward that one cannot construct a satisfactory theory of 
economic evolution simply by way of analogy with the biological model. Still, a reference 
to these four major building-blocks of the biological model might help in illustrating the 
specificities of evolution in the social domain. 
Units of selection 
First, consider the nature of the fundamental unit of selection. In a very intuitive 
fashion, one may spot quite a few potential candidates to be loose equivalents of the genes 
in biological theory. For example, technologies, policies, behavioral patterns, cultural traits 
are obviously influential in determining what the agents embodying them -- either 
All the foregoing caveats also apply to literal applications of biological models to economic analysis, 
including "evolutionary games." It is not the purpose of this work to discuss the latter stream of literature 
(for a survey, see D. Friedman (1991)). Let us just point out that, in their current format, they generally 
embody quite restrictive assumptions on the relationship between intrinsic traits (i.e., the metaphorical 
equivalent of "genes") and "strategies." Moreover, another common assumption is the f ~ r y  of the 
environment determining relative Yimess." Even under these special conditions asymptotic outcomes do nor 
generally guarantee convergence to Pareto-dominant equilibria (and, sometimes, in discrete-time games not 
even to Nash equilibria at all: cf. Dekel and Scotchmer (1991)). Of course, it is only reasonable ro expect 
these "suboptimal" propenies of evolution to carry over to the more general evolutionary setups that we are 
discussing here. 
individuals or organizations -- do. (The "agents" here should impressionistically map ixto 
the phenotypic level.) And technologies, cultural traits, etc. are also something that can 
be modified, and improved, from generation to generation, and which has its own rules of 
transmission. In fact, several scholars have proposed arguments of an evolutionary type 
in the domains of culture, law, institutional history, science and, of course, economics (for 
a critical appraisal, see Nelson (1993)). We do not have any problem with the attribution 
of the role of "fundamental unit" to different entities according to the objects under 
consideration. For example, when one talks about the "ecology of the mind" one refers to 
the changes of some underlying cognitive structures occurring along the history of 
interactions with other human beings and the environment of artifacts. Here the 
"primitives" which the evolutionary process is supposed to structure, modify and select are 
not genes but plausibly mental categories, representation, rules. In domains nearer to our 
concerns here, evolutionary processes have often been represented as dynamics in some 
technology-space and, less often, a space of behaviors or organizational forms (we shall 
come back to some examples later on). But in all these instances of applications of an 
evolutionary perspective to social change, a crucial issue -- in our view, not yet sufficiently 
explored -- concerns the relationship between the level of the "primitives" (so to speak, the 
genotypic level) and the behaviors of the units which embody them and upon which 
selection is supposed to operate. The example of "technological evolution," which we shall 
consider a t  some detail, is a good illustration of this point. 
It does not always happen that one can say that the economy or the society directly 
"select" among competing technologies (hence also the models based on this premise should 
be considered as a first approximation to more complex dynamics). Sometimes, societies 
do directly select on technologies: for example, in many medical technologies it occurs 
through professional jud,ments based on the peer review system; somewhat similarly, 
procurement agencies in military technologies perform as direct selectors among alternative 
technological systems. However, quite often alternative technologies are incorporate 
within organizations -- typically firms -- whose relative competitiveness (i.e., "fitness") is 
mediated through their behavioral patterns -- e.g., their decision rules concerning 
investment, R&D, pricing, scrapping, diversification, e t ~ . ~  Moreover, one typically observes 
a multiplicity of selection environments affecting the probability of growth and survival of 
each organization -- first, of all, the product-markets and the market for finance. Indeed, 
it happens in biology and even more so in social dynamics that the objects of selection are 
not single elementary traits but structures of much higher dimensions in which they are 
nested. So, for example, markets choose relatively complex products or technological 
systems, and not individual elements of technological knowledge; and penalize or reward 
~vhole organizations and not specific behaviors. Therefore, assuming some underlying 
space of technology and organizational traits as the appropriate "primitive" dimensions of 
evolution, one still needs some theory of organizational development in order to relate 
"evolution" and "selection." This is also a major area of complementarity between 
evolutionary theories and business economics. Notions like those of "organizational 
routines" and "competencies" begin to forge that link (see also the chapter in this volume 
Evolutionary models such as Nelson and Winter (1982), Silverberg, Dosi and Orsenigo (19881, 
Chiaromonte and Dosi (1991), Metcalfe (1992), all i l l u s~a t e  this complementariry of technological and 
behavioral features in determining competitiveness, and also, admittedly, t!!e rudimentary nature of some 
behavioral assumptions. 
by Dosi and Teece), but, certainly, an item high on the research agenda is the emergence 
and evolution of routines themsel~es. '~ 
Mechanisms and criteria of selection 
Another obvious building block of evolutionary theories concerns the mechanisms 
and criteria of selection. It has already been mentioned that "fitness" is likely to be judged 
on different and possibly conflicting criteria. For example, f m s  might be rationed to 
different degrees on the financial markets according to their cash-flow, or their accounting 
profits, or the expectations that investors hold about future profits; and in the product- 
markets, the opportunities of growth and survival may be determined on the grounds of 
the relative quality of their products, their prices, after-sale servicing, delivery delays, 
marketing networks, etc." This multidimensionaliry of selection criteria clearly demands 
that evolutionary models of, e.g., technological or economic change specify the interacrive 
mechanisms through which selection occurs. It is indeed sad to admit in a book primarily 
conceived for Eastern European countries undertaking the transition to 'market economies' 
that in fact one knows very little on how markets actually work and even less of the 
fundamental differences in the selection dynamics across a variety of them!12 
lo Some preliminary ideas and models are in Marengo (1992), Dosi and Marengo (1993), Dosi et al. 
(1993a). 
'I Admittedly, most evolutionary models developed so far in economics are based on relatively simple 
selection criteria, e.g., profits (Nelson and Winter (1982)) or prices and delivery details (Silverberg, Dosi and 
Orsenigo (1988)). However, they should be understood as frrst approximations to more complex selection 
dynamics. 
l2 For example, one does not have any good theory of why in most markets economic agents urilize 
prices and not quantiries as their main decision variables, or why observed price dispersions a t  any moment 
u e  what they are. Of course, it is easy to blame this lamentable state of affairs on onhodox ecoriomic 
theory, which, by focusing on the property of equilibria, has made irrelevant the analysis of adjusrmext 
processes. For one of the rare observation-based descriptions of a market which raises a lot of challenging 
Selection in the social arena and its relationship with some notion of "fitness" 
immediately confronts the question of the endogeneity of the selection criteria themselves. 
It has been mentioned earlier that also in natural sciences it is the general case that what 
is selected -- in favor or against -- might be determined in some complicated and nonlinear 
ways by the distribution of actual populations present at a point in time and by their 
history. However, one might still hold that the selection criteria -- that is, the variables 
ultimately affecting probabilities of survival -- remain relatively invariant: for example, the 
rates of reproduction, or the efficiency in accessing food. On the contrary, this might not 
be so in many economic and social circumstances. 
Consider as an illustration the metaphor of the "evolutionary house building" from 
the previous section. One can imagine that the selection criterion is "cost per square foot" 
or this and also "height" and "resistance to earthquakes." 'One can easily figure our very 
complicated evolutionary dynamics on the "landscape" -- as biologists sometimes call it -- 
defined in these three dimensions. However, it still holds that in some intuitive sense 
"firter" stands for "lower cost," "more height," "more resistance." Consider now the case 
where selection occurs only on the grounds of "nice outlooks" and suppose that people 
change their tastes along the way by talking to each other, reading art books, visiting other 
towns living in the house. Here one faces also a basic indeterminacy concerning the very 
dimensions of the "evolutionary landscape." There is still variation and selection but the 
theory is unable to specify even ex-post the general variables which have determined why 
zrchitecture has "evolved" toward brickhouses in one place and neogothic ones in another. 
tieoretical questions, see W a n  (1991). For some general considerations, cf. O k l n  (1981). 
Relatedly, also the interpretative power of the models change: in the latter circumstances 
they are obviously inapt to make "predictions," and also the "explanation" that they provide 
might be limited to some invariant characteristics of the process (for example of social 
imitation, etc.). Only a detailed historical reconstruction may be able to account for the 
fact that, say, the English ended up eating what the majority of mankind consider atrocious 
food and the French a sophisticated cuisine. 
Probably, in social sciences one encounters different combinations between the two 
extreme cases. Sometimes, it is rather straightforward to identlfy the dimensions nesting 
the process of search for "better metal cutting machines." Other cases, such as the 
dynamics of financial markets described by John Maynard Keynes with his "beauty contest" 
metaphor, look more like the second extreme.13 
Adaptation and variation 
The last fundamental building-block of evolutionary theories concerns the processes 
by which agents adapt, learn and at the same time novelties are always produced in the 
system. We shall argue that, at this level, a natural ingredient is a representation of 
decisions and actions -- of individuals and organizations -- which departs in most respects 
from "rational" neoclassical models. Our basic hypothesis is that agents follow various 
forms of rule-pyided behaviors which are context-specific and, to some extent, event- 
independent (in the sense that actions might be invariant to fine changes in the 
information regarding the environment). On the other hand, agents are always capable 
of experimenting and discovering new rules and, thus, they continue to introduce 
l3  And so might well be the evolution of cultures, religions, etc.: see Nelson (1993). 
behavioral novelties into the system. (More in Nelson and Winter (1982), Dosi and Egidi 
(1991), March and Simon (1993).) In order to illustrate these points, it is useful to 
compare evolutionary and neoclassical behavioral assumptions. 
The central presumption in neoclassical theory is that the observed configuration of 
economic variables can be explained as the result of rational actors -- individuals, 
households, firms, other formal organizations -- having made choices that maximize their 
utility, given the constraints they face, and that they have made no systematic mistakes 
about that. The question of how these optimal decisions came to be is not a basic part of 
the theory. Sometimes the theory is rationalized in terms of the actors actually having 
correctly thought through the decision context. Sometimes the rationalization is that the 
optimal response has been learned or has evolved rather than having been in some sense 
precalculated, but in any case can be understood "as if' the actor had actually calculsted. 
Uncertainty and unfortunate results (from the point of view of the actor) that comes 
about because of bad luck of the draw can be admitted under this theory, under either 
interpretation. The theory also can handle actor errors that occur because the actor has 
only limited information about certain key parameters which determine the outcomes of 
mzking various decisions, and in effect bets wrong regarding these parameters. Holvever, 
systematic mistakes associated with ignorance, or wrong head understanding, of the basic 
features of the situation, are not admitted. The theory "works" by presuming the actor has 
a basically correct understanding of their actual choices and their consequences, as the 
theorist models that choice context. It is not a theory that tries to get "inside the actor's 
head," as does, for example, psychiatric theory. Put another way, the rationality assumed 
by the theory is objective not subjective. 
An associated notion is that of equilibrium. In most economic analyses there are a 
number of actors. Each is assumed to optimize, and the optimization decisions are 
presumed to be consistent with each other, in that each actor's action is optimizing in the 
sense above, given the other actor's optimizing actions. 
This basic mode of explaining behavior, including the making of predictions about 
how various possible developments might change behavior, has been employed regarding 
a vast range of human and organizational action, from analyses of the effects of the oil 
price shocks of the 1970s, to analyses of the effects of the presence of the death penalty 
in crime. 
There are several different (but not inconsistent) kinds of reasons why evolutionary 
theorists have backed away from rational choice theory, and adopted a quite different 
alternative. First, it can be argued that while rational choice theory provides useful insight 
into certain kinds of situations and phenomena, it sheds only limited light on others. An 
important motivation for evolutionary theorizing about, for example, technological advance 
is that most authors in this field believe that the canons of rational choice theory provide 
only limited guidance for study of that subject. Second, in many cases models of choice 
situations possess multiple equilibria. In each one can specify the optimizing choice, but 
behavior and achievement differ greatly across the possible equilibria. A key question then 
is why the particular equilibrium turned out to be the operative one, and one way of trying 
to answer this question is to appeal to evolutionary arguments. Third, in any case rational 
choice theory provides an explanation for behavior that takes the actor's objectives and 
constraints as given. One can argue that an explanation that considers how social values 
and institutions have evolved and affect the choices presently available to actors may 
provide a deeper and more illuminating understanding of behavior than a rational choice 
explanation alone, even if the latter can explain at one level. 
Let us first consid~r the issue of the limits of the plausible domain of rational choice 
theory. It is important to recognize, precisely because it is usually repressed, that most 
economists understand very well how dubious, in any complex context, is the rationale for 
rational choice theory that presumes the "actors have correctly thought it all through." 
Beneath the surface faith that actions "optimize" is an understanding that actors are only 
"boundedly rational," to use Herbert Simon's term (1986). The other rationalization -- that 
the actors have somehow eliminated behavior that was not up to snuff -- is the argument 
most economists really believe. (For a good discussion of this point see Winter (1986).) 
But when put this way, rational choice theory would seem applicable to contexts to 
which the actors can be presumed familiar, and evolutionary theoretic arguments can be 
understood as an attempt to deal with situations where this presumption does not seem 
zpplicable. In parriculsr, evolutionary theory can be argued to be needed in analysis of 
behavior in contexts that involve si,gificant elements of novelty, so that it c a n ~ o t  be 
presumed that good responses already have been learned, but rather that they are still to 
be learned. 
More generally, evolutionary theory can be viewed as a theory about how society, 
or the economy, learn: in very special cases leanring leads to the convergence to some 
repertoires of "optimal behaviors;" normally it entails more or less temporary, and highly 
suboptimal, adaptation to what are perceived to be the prevailing environmental 
constraints and opportunities, and also a lot of systematic errors, trials, and discoveries. 
As we shall see, this position characterizes economists who have seen economic 
growth as a process largely driven by continuing technological advance. Virtually all 
scholars of technological advance highlight the uncertainties, the differences in judopent 
among experts, and the surprises that are common in the process, which would seem to 
take it outside the domain of rational choice theory. W l e  the actors involved can be 
regarded as having certain objectives in mind, as trying their best to analyze what they 
should do, and as drawing on past experience to gain insight into the present, the actions 
they take cannot be understood as "optimizing" except in the sense that they represent the 
actors' best bet regarding what to do. Under these circumstances, the theory of 
microeconomic adaptation and mutation focusses on the nature of learning processes. 
This line of argument would appear to preserve for neoclassical theory analysis of 
decision making in situations that are relatively stable and actions repetitive. However, if 
one bases rational choice theory on accumulated learning, there are apparent limitations 
to the explanatory power of the theory even in these cases. In particular, learning 
processes may be very path dependent. Where they end up may depend to a considerable 
degree on how they got there. While in the steady state actual behavior may be locally 
optimal, there might be other behavior patterns that would be locally optimal too, some 
of these in fact much better from the actor's point of view than the actual behavior. Thus 
a "rational choice" explanation is, at best, incomplete, because it does not explain how the 
pvticular local context which frames choices came to be the point of rest. As we shall see, 
this point of view is a major motivation for evolutionary modeling of "path dependent" 
dynamic processes. 
What about the argument that competition will force f m s  either to learn the best 
way of doing things or go out of business? Can't one ague that, if competitive forces are 
very strong, firms that aren't as efficient as the best firms may be forced out of business? 
Perhaps one can. But note that the standard here is defined by the most efficient existing 
f m s ,  not the efficiency that is theoretically possible. And that benchmark level of 
efficiency may be determined by the actual learning processes that are operative and how 
far they have proceeded. Thus analyses that do not deal explicitly with learning paths may 
provide, at best, a quite limited analysis of prevailing equilibrium. 
In addition, in many industries there are strong reasons to doubt that selection 
pressures are strong enough to drive out all firms that are not as efficient as the le-d a er. 
Empirical studies show that the distribution of firms in an industry at any time often 
contains very considerable diversity of productivity and profitability. Further, many of the 
actors in the economy are not firms. There are universities, legal systems, labor 
institutions, etc. And these generally are not subject to sharp selection pressures, at least 
not of a "market" variety. 
From a similar but slightly different angle, the neoclassical way of explaining 
behavior and action can be faulted not so much for exaggerating the power of human and 
organizational intelligence -- as argued above most economists believe the theoretical case 
for "rational choice" is experiential learning not calculating capabilities -- but not for 
recognizing the extent to which learned behaviors are guided and constrained by socially 
held and enforced values, norms, beliefs, customs, and generally accepted practices. This 
argument joins with the one above in proposing that to understand behavior one must 
come to grips with the forces that have molded it, and in rejecting that such analysis can 
be short cut by a simple argument that, however learning happened, the ultimate result can 
be predicted and explained as optimizing behavior. 
Conversely, evolutionary theories in economics cornfoxably match those analyses 
from social psychology, sociology, organization theory, suggesting the general occurrence 
of various rule-guided behaviors, ofren taking the form of relatively invariant routines 
(Nelson and Winter (1982)), whose origin is shaped by the learning history of the agents, 
their pre-existing knowledge and, most likely, also their value systems and their 
prejudices.'4 Precisely because there is nothing which guarar.rees, in general, the 
optimality of these routines, notional opportunities for the discovery of "better" ones are 
always present. Hence also the permanent scope for search and novelty (i.e., in the 
biological analogy, "mutations"). Putting it another way, the behavioral foundations of 
evolutionary theories rest on learning processes involving imperfect adap~ation and 
mistake-ridden discoveries. This applies equally to the domains of technologies, behaviors 
and organizational setups. Of course, the "imperfections" of adaptation and the conrinuous 
existence of opportunities of "doing better" and "inventing new things" implies that 
heterogeneity is rarely weeded out by environmental selection. Possible phenomena of 
historical "lock-in" (which we shall discuss below) are mosr often disrupted by the 
emergence of novelties, which under certain circumstances, can "invade" apparently well 
l 4  On these points, see also Winter (1986) and (1987), Dosi and Egidi (1991), Dosi and !v!arer.go 
(1993). 
established system of, e.g., production, corporate organization, consumption, etc. 
With these considerations in mind on the basic "building blocks" of evolutionary 
theories, let us turn to some applications to technological and economic dynamics. 
(iv) Technolo~cal  and Economic Chan~e:  Some Examples of Evolutionaw Dvnarnics 
Technical and Orqanizational Channe 
A number of analysts have proposed that technology evolve. The analyses of 
Freeman (1982), Rosenberg ((1976) and (1982)), Basalla (1988), Mohyr (1990), Nelson 
and Winter (1977), Dosi ((1982) and (1984)) and Vincenti (1990) are strikingly similar 
in many respects. (A survey is in Dosi (1988).) As an illustration let us consider the 
discussion of Vincenti. 
In Vincenti's theory, the community of technologists at any time faces a number of 
problems, challenges, and opportunities. He draws most of his examples from aircraft 
technology. Thus, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, aircraft designers knew well that the 
standard pattern of hooking wheels to fuselage or wings could be improved upon, given 
the higher speeds planes were now capable of with the new body and wing designs and 
more powerful engines that had come into existence. They were aware of several different 
possibilities for incorporating wheels into a more streamlined design. Vincenti argues that 
trials of these different alternatives were somewhat blind. It turned out that having the 
wheel be retractable solved the problem better than did the other alternatives explored at 
that time. Thus, "fitness" here is defined in terms of solving particular technological 
problems better. 
But, identification of this criterion also pushes the analytical problem back a stage. 
What determines whether one solution is better than another? At times Vincenti i,vritss as 
if the criterion were innate in the technological problem, or determined by consensus of 
a technological community who are cooperatively involved in advancing the art. 
However, Vincenti also recognizes, explicitly, that the aircraft designers are largely 
employed in a number of competing aircraft companies, where profitability may be affected 
by the relative quality and cost of the aircraft designs they are employing, comparing ivith 
those employed by their competitors. But then what is better or worse in a problem 
. 
solution is determined at least partially by the "market," the properties of an aircrzft 
customers are willing to pay for, the costs associated with different designs solutions, the 
strategies of the suppliers, the changes in the requirements of the buyers, etc. 
This co-evolutionary argument regarding technologies and organizations is 
prominently illustrated by Alfred ChandleJs research ((1 962) and (1 990)) on the 
emergence of the complex structures that characterize modem multi-product firms.'5 He 
argues that a variety of technological developments occurred during the mid and late 19th 
century which opened up the possibility for business firms to be highly productive and 
profitable if they could organize to operate at large scales of output, and with a relatively 
wide if connected range of products. He describes various organizational innovations that 
were tried, and while his central focus is on those that "succeeded," it is clear from his 
account that not all did. Arguing in a manner similar to Vincenti, Chandler's "fitness 
criterion" is that the new organizational form solved an organizational problem. 
l 5  A reappraisal of Chandler contribution in the light of contemporary theories of the firm is in Teece 
(1993). 
Presumably the solution to that problem enabled a firm to operate at lower costs, or with 
greater scale and scope, in either case, with greater . . profitability. Like Vincenti, Chandler 
clearly sees a community, in this case of managers. But he also sees companies competing 
with each other. His argument is that companies which found and adopted efficient 
managerial styles and structural forms early won out over their competitors who did not, 
or who lagged in doing so. 
As already mentioned in the previous section, the link between evolution in the 
space of technological characteristics and market dynamics rests to a great extent on the 
organizational and behavioral traits of firms, which in much of evolutionary literature is 
approximated with routines. More specifically, Nelson and Winter (1982) distinguish 
benveen three different kinds of routines. 
First, there are those that might be called "standard operating procedures," those 
that determine and define how and how much a firm produces under various 
circumstances, given its capital stock and other constraints on its actions that are fixed in 
the short run. Second, there are routines that determine the investment behavior of the 
h, the equations that govern its growth or decline (measured in terms of its capital 
stock) as a function of its profits, and perhaps other variables. Third, the deliberative 
processes of the firm, those that involve searching for better ways of doing things, also are 
viewed as guided by routines. 
The concept of a technoloRica1 paradim (Dosi (1982) and (1988)), Nelson and 
Winter ((1977) and (1982)) attempts to capture both the nature of the technological 
knowledge upon which innovative activities draw and the organizational procedures fcr the 
search and exploitation of the innovations. First, it refers to the set of understandings 
about  articular technologies that are shared by firms and engineering communities about 
its present and innate limitations. Second, and relatedly, it embodies the prevailing views 
and heuristics on "how to make things better." And, third, it is often associated with 
shared ideas of "artifacts" which are there to be improved in their performances and made 
cheaper in their production. 
We have used the term technolonical traiectory to refer to the path of improvement 
taken by that technolog, given technologists' perceptions of opportunities, and the market 
and other evaluarion mechanisms that determined what kinds of improvements would be 
profitable. (Sahal, 1981, employs analogous concepts.) Note also that the fundamental 
dimensions of the trajectory in the appropriate technology space are analogous to the 
"fitness criteria" discussed earlier. By the technolo~cal regjme we mean the complex of 
firms, professional disciplines and societies, university training and research programs, and 
legal and regulatory structures that support and constrain development within a regime and 
along particular trajectories. 
Evolutionarv models of wowth fuelled bv technical advance. 
Let us now consider a set of models of economic growth in which technical advance is the 
driving force, and within which technologies and industrial structures co-evolve. The 
outcomes of this processes are aggregate phenomena such as the growth of labor 
productivity and per capita incomes, relatively regular patterns of innovation diffusion, 
persistent fluctuations in the rates of income growth, a secular increase in capital 
intensities, and other "stylized facts" which traditionally pertain to the economics of growth 
and development (no single evolutionary model is able alone to account for all these 
regularities at the same time, but the degree of consistency between the different models 
focussing on subsets of them is quite remarkable). 
Virtually all serious scholars of technical advance have stressed the uncertainty, the 
differences of opinion among experts, the surprises, that mark the process. Mechanical 
analogies involving moving competitive equilibria in which the actors always behave "as 
if' the scene were familiar to them seem quite inappropriate. Most scholars agree that the 
process must be understood as an evolutionary one, in the sense sketched earlier. 
The problem addressed by the authors considered in this section has been to devise 
a theory of growth capable of explaining the observed macroeconomic patterns, but on the 
basis of an evolutionary theory of technical change rather than one that presumes 
continuing neoclassical equilibrium. 
It would seem inevitable that, in any such theory, firms would be key actors, both 
in the making of the investments needed to develop new technologies and bring them into 
practice, and in the use of technologies to produce goods and services. Indeed it is not 
hard to tell a quite compelling story about economic growth based on firms who compete 
wirh each other largely through the technologies they introduce and employ. Joseph 
Schurnpeter (1940) laid out that analysis over fifty years ago, and modem analyses largely 
build upon his conjectures. 
Let us concentrate on the first formalized evolutionary model of growth, 
microfounded into an explicit process of search and competition among heterogeneous 
actors (Nelson and Winter (1974) and the developments in (1982)). 
The central actors in this model are business firms. Firms are, from one point of 
view, the entities that are more or less "fit," in this case more or less profitable. But from 
another point of view firms can be regarded as merely the camers of "technologies," in the 
form of particular practices or capabilities that determine "what they do" and "how 
productively" in particular circumstances. While in principle, within the model search 
behaviors could be focussed on any one of the fm' prevailing routines described earlier - 
- its technologies, or other standard operating procedures, its investment rules, or even its 
prevailing search procedures --  in practice, in all of Nelsop-Winter models, search is 
assumed to uncover new production techniques or to improve prevailing ones. It  is 
therefore convenient to call such search R&D. Other authors of similar models have 
invoked the term "learning" to describe analogous improvement processes. 
Firm search processes both provide the source of differential fitness -- firms whose 
R&D turn up more profitable processes of production or products will gro~v relative to their 
competitors -- and also tend to bind them together as a community. In the models in 
question a firm's R&D partly is focussed on innovating, coming up with something better 
than what its competitors are doing. But its R&D activities also attend to what its 
competitors are doing, and profitable innovations are, with a lag, imitated by other firms 
in the industry. 
The firm, or rather the collection of firms in the industry, perhaps involvin, u new 
f m s  coming into the industry and old ones exiting, is viewed as operating within an 
exogenously determined environment. The profitability of any firm is determined by what 
it is doing, and what its competitors do. Generally the environment can be interpreted as 
a "market," or set of markets. 
Note that in the theory that has been sketched above, just as routines are ana10,oous 
to genes, firms are analogous to phenotypes in biological evolutionary theory, but there are 
profound differences. First, f m  do not have a natural life span, and not all ultimately 
die. Neither can they be regarded as having a natural size. Some may be big, some small. 
Thus in assessing the relative importance of a particular routine in the industry mix, or 
analyzing whether it is expanding or contracting in relative use, it is not sufficient to 
"count" the firms employing it. One must consider their size, or whether they are growing 
or contracting. Second, unlike phenotypes that are stuck with their genes, firms are not 
stuck with their routines. Indeed they have built-in mechanisms for changing them. 
The logic of the model defines a dynamic stochastic system. It can be modeled as 
a complex Markov process. A standard iteration can be described as follows. At the 
existing moment of time all firms can be characterized by their capital stocks and prevailing 
routines. Decision rules keyed to market conditions look to those conditions' "last period." 
Inputs employed and outputs produced by all firms then are determined. The narket rhen 
determines prices. Given the technology and other routines used by each firm, each firm's 
profitability then is determined, and the investmenr rule then determines how much each 
fm expanded or contracts. Search routines focus on one or another aspect of the firm's 
behavior and capabilities, and (stochastically) come up with proposed modifications which 
may or may not be adopted. The system is now ready for the next period's iteration. 
The model described above can be evaluated on a number of different counts. One 
is whether the view of behavior it contains, in abstract form, is appealing given the conrext 
it purports to analyze. The individuals and organizations in the model act, as humans do 
in the models of most other social disciplines except economics, on the basis of habits or 
customs or beliefs; in the Nelson-Winter model all these define routines. There certainly 
is no presumption, as there is in neoclassical theory, that what they do is "optimal" in any 
way, save that metaphorically the actors do the best they know how to do. Some scholars, 
while recognizing a need to pull away from neoclassical canons, might argue that the 
model sees humans and human organizations as far less "rational" than they are. Indeed, 
it is quite possible to build more foresight into the actors of an evolutionary theory (see 
also below). Of course, if one wants a model in which it is presumed that the actors fully 
understand the context, one might as well use a rational choice model. But then the 
formidable challenge facing the "rational" models (let alone a supposedly "rational" actor) 
is what it means to "fully understand" the context, whenever the latter depends in some 
complex, nonlinear ways on the distribution of rnicrodecisions, and on chance, and is 
always full of surprises. 
The model can be judged by the appeal of the theory of technical progress built into 
it. The view is certainly "evolutionary," and in that regard square: well with the accounts 
given by scholars of technical advance like Vincenti. However, it contains two "economist" 
kinds of presumptions. One is that profitability determines the "fitness" of a technology. 
The other is the central role played by "firms." In any case, the central purpose of this type 
of models is to explain economic growth at a macroeconomic level. Thus a fundamental 
question about them is this. Can they generate, hence in a sense explain, e.g., the rising 
output per worker, growing capital intensity, rising real wages, and a relatively constant 
rate of return on capital, that have been the standard pattern in advanced industrial 
nations? The answer is that they can, and in ways that make analytic sense. 
Within Nelson-Winter models a successful technological innovation generates profits 
for the firm making it, and leads to a capital formation and growth of the firm. Firm 
growth generally is sufficient to outweigh any decline in employment per unit of output 
associated with productivity growth, and hence results in an increase in the demand for 
labor, which pulls up the real wage rate. This latter consequence means that capital using 
but labor saving innovations now become more profitable, and when by chance they 
appear as a result of a "search," they will be adopted, thus pulling up the level of capital 
intensity in the economy. At the same time that labor productivity, real wages, and capital 
intensity are rising, the same mechanisms hold down the rate of return on capital. If the 
profit rate rises, say because of the creation of especially productive new technology, the 
high profits will induce an investment boom, which will pull up Xvages, and drive capital 
returns back down. 
At the same time that the model generates "macro" time series that resemble the 
actual data, beneath the aggregate at any time there is considerable variation among firms 
in the technologies they are using, their productivity, and their profitability. Within this 
simple model (which represses differences in other aspects of firm capabilities and 
behavior), the technologies employed by firms uniquely determine their relative 
performance. And within this model more productive and profitable techniques tend to 
replace less productive ones, through two mechanisms. Firms using more profitable 
technologies grow. And more profitable technologies tend to be imitated and adopted by 
firms who had been using less profitable ones. 
Soete and Turner (1984), Metcalfe (1988, 1992), Silverberg (1987) and Metcalfe 
and Gibbons (1989) have developed sophisticated variants on this theme. These authors 
repress the stochastic element in the introduction of new technologies that was prominent 
in the model described above and, in effect, work with a given set of technologies. 
However, within these models each of the individual technologies may be improving over 
tine, possibly at different rates. At the same time, firms are tending to allocate their 
investment portfolios more heavily towards the more profitable technologies than to~vards 
the less. As a result, productivity in the industry as a whole, and measured aggregated 
"technical advance," is the consequence of two different kinds of forces. One is the 
improvement of the individual technologies. The other is the expansion of use of the more 
productive technologies relative to the less productive ones. 
Both groups of authors point out that the latter phenomenon is likely to be a more 
potent source of productivity growth when there is prevailing large variation in the 
productivity of technologies in wide use, than when the best technology already dominates 
in use. Thus the aggregate growth performance of the economy is strongly related to the 
prevailing variation beneath the aggregate. 
The model of Silverberg, Dosi, and Orsenigo (1988) develops the basic notions of 
evolutionary theory in another direction. In that model there are only two technologies. 
One is potentially better than the other, but that potential will not be achieved unless 
effort is put into improving prevailing practice. Rather than incorporating a separate 
"search activity, in Silverberg et al. a firm improves its prevailing procedures 
(technologies) through learning associated with operation. What a firm learns is reflected 
in its increased productivity in using that technolog, but some of the learning "leak out" 
and enables others using that technology to improve their productivity for free, as it were. 
In contrast with Nelson-Winter models where firms do not "look forward" to 
anticipate future developments, in the model considered here firms, or at least some of 
them, recognize that the technology that initially is behind in productivity is potentially the 
better technology, and also that they can gain advantage over their competitors if they 
invest in using and learning with it. Also in contrast with Nelson-Winter models, a firm 
may employ some of both technologies, and hence may use some of its profits from using 
the prevailing best technology to invest in experience with presently inferior techr.ology 
that is potentially the best. If no firm does this, then of course the potential of the 
potentially better technology never will be realized. 
An early "innovator" may come out a winner, if it learns rapidly, and little of its 
learning "spills out," or its competitors are sluggish in getting into the new technology 
themselves. On the other hand, it may come out a loser, if its learning is slow and hence 
the cost of operating the new technology remains high, or most of its learning "spills out" 
and its competitors get in a timely manner, taking advantage for free of the ~ ~ i l l o ~ : e r . ' ~  
A few other evolutionary models of growth have been developed. Gunnar Eliasson 
has developed a series of phenomenologically rich models which have been "realistically" 
calibrated on the Swedish economic (cf. Eliasson's chapter in Day and Eliasson (1986)). 
l6 Another difference between Nelson-Winter models and Silverberg-Dosi-Orsenigo is that in the laner 
who "wins" and who "loses" is determined by a selection process captured by a replicator-type d j ~ a m i c s  
where market shares change according to the relative values of a vector of characteristics, synthetically called 
"competitiveness." 
Chiaromonte and Dosi (1992) merge many of the elements of Nelson-Winter stochastic 
search for new techniques and Silverberg-Dosi-Orsenigo equipment-related learnins in a 
two-sector evolutionary model. Silverberg and Lenhart (1992) study the time series 
properties of gro~vth dynamics driven by a Poisson arrival of innovations jointly with a 
Goodwin-type dynamics of wages and investment. Iwai (1984) and Coulisk (1989) 
propose other interesting variants of evolutionary models of industrial structures and 
aggregate growth, respectively. 
Evolution of industries 
A joint account of the analyses focussed on the evolution of technology and those 
focussed on the history of business organizations also appear to suggest that some "typical" 
evolutionary patterns often appear at industry level (this does not rule out si,onificant 
exceptions, and one still does not know enough on when and why other dynamics 
emerge) . I 7  
The basic model of the evolution of firms and industrial structures (what is 
sometimes called the "industry life cycle") goes this way. In the early stages of an industry 
-- say automobiles -- f m s  tend to be small, and entry relatively easy, reflecting the 
diversity of technolo$es being employed, and their rapid change. However, as a "dominant 
design" emerges, barriers to entry begin to rise as the scale and capital needed for 
competitive production grows. Also, with the basic technology knowledge, learning 
becomes cumulative, and incumbent finns are advantaged relative to potential entrants for 
that reason as well. After a shakeout, industry structure settles down to a collection of 
l7  Contributions from the field of "organizational ecolog)? also tackle similar life-cycle phenoneria, 
albeit from a different angle; see Hannan and Freeman (1989) and Hannan and Carroll (1991). 
established largish firms. 
Part of this analysis stems from the work by Abernathy and Utterback (1975), done 
nearly two decades ago, who argued that with basic product configuration stabilized, R&D 
tends to shift towards improving production processes. When the market is dibided up 
among a large variety of variants, and new products are appearing all the time, product 
specific process R&D is not particularly profitable. But with the emergence of a dominant 
des ip ,  the profits from developing better ways of producing it can be considerable. 
Opportunities for operating on a large scale raise the profitability of exploiting latent 
economies of scale. Generally large scale production is capital intensive, and thus capital 
intensity rises for this reason, as well as because with the stabilization of product design 
it is profitable to try to devise ways to mechanize production. Since highly mechanized 
production is profitable only at large scale of output, growth of mechanization and larger 
scale production go together for this reason as well. 
Abernathy and Utterback argue that these changes cause major changes in the 
organization of fim and the industry after a dominant design is established, and as the 
technology matures. Mueller and Tilton (1969) made the same argument about the 
evolution of industry structure some years before Abernathy and Utterback, based on a 
somewhat less detailed theory of the evolution of technology. Over the last decade articles 
by Gort and Klepper (1982), Klepper and Grady (1990), Utterback and Suarez (1992), and 
a recent analytic survey piece by Klepper (1992), have greatly enriched the analysis. 
However, it still remains to be seen how general are these "life cycles" patterns of industrial 
evolution. There are hvo major unsettled issues here, both linked 14th the charecteristics 
of the learning processes underlying the "competitive advantages" (or disadvantages) of 
films. 
A first issue concerns the influence that particular "paradi,sms" and "regimes," as 
defined earlier, exert on industrial dynamics. The findings in Pavitt (1984) on the size and 
principal activities of innovating f m s ,  suggest that significant groups of industrial sectors 
might not conform to the "life cycle" description, due for example to the specificity and 
tacitness of the knowledge that individual firms embody and to the absence of strong 
tendencies toward economies of scale (these groups include, for different reasons, machine- 
tools, scientific instruments, textile and several others). The potential variety in the 
evolutionary patterns of industries, interpretable on the grounds of different learning and 
selection regimes is also corroborated by the simulation exercises in Winter (1984) and 
Dosi et al. (1993). A second major issue concerns the degrees of disruption induced upon 
industrial structures by discontinuities in the knowledge base and in the "established ivays 
of doing things" (i.e., discontinuities in the technological trajectories of that industry). 
While much of the literature on technology of product cycles stops the narrative 
afier a dominant design has emerged and industry structure stabilizes, there is a number 
of recent theoretical and empirical studies that ask the question, 'What happens to a sertled 
industry structure when a new technology comes along that has the promise of being 
significantly superior to the old?". Thus transistors and later integrated circuit technology 
ultimately came to replace vacuum tubes and wired together circuits. At the present time 
biotechnology promises a radically new way to create and produce a wide variety of 
pharmaceuticals, and industrial and agricultural chemicals. The term "competence 
destroying technical advance" has been coined by Tushman and Anderson (1956) to 
characterize such new technologies when the skills needed to deal with them are different 
than the skills and experience that were relevant to the old technologies they threaten to 
replace. 
A considerable body of empirical work now has grown up which persuasively 
documents that certain new technologies were competence de'stroying in the above sense. 
(See, e.g., Tushman and Anderson, 1986, and Henderson and Clark, 1990). In such 
instances, the old established firms have had great difficulty in acquiring the new 
competencies they needed in order to survive in the new regime. New companies built 
around the new needed competencies tend to come ir. and grab a si,pificant share of the 
new market, or firms ~ v h o  have established the needed competencies in other lines of 
business where they had been appropriate now shift over to the new area to employ their 
skills there. The extent to which technological discontinuities are associated with 
organizational discontinuities is yet another topic of research in common benveen 
evolutionary analyses of industrial change and business economics (see also the chapter by 
Dosi and Teece in this volume). 
Chance and structures: path-dependencies and dvnamic increasinp returns 
The discussion above leads naturally to another cluster of analytic and empirical 
issues coming up in evolutionary theorizing about long run economic change --- path 
dependency, dynamic increasing returns, and their interaction. Path dependencies are built 
into all of the models considered above, and dynamic increasing returns into some. 
Thus in virtually all of the models, the particular firms that survive in the lon, = run 
are influenced by events, to a considerable extent random, that happen early in a model's 
run. To the extent that firms specialize in particular kinds of technology, what 
technologies survive is influenced similarly by early random events. In some of the models, 
"dynamic increasing returns" makes path dependency particularly strong. Thus in 
Silverberg, Dosi, and Orsenigo (1988) the more a firm uses a technology the better it gets 
at h a t  technology. More, some of the learning "spills over" to benefit other firms using 
that particular technology. Thus the more a technology is used, the better it becomes vis-A- 
vis its competitors. 
But while path dependencies and dynamic increasing returns are built into most of 
the models we already have considered, this was not the center of attention of the authors. 
Over the past few years, however, a considerable literature in evolutionary economics has 
grown up focussed on these topics. The works of Brian Arthur (1988, 1989), Arthur, Yuri 
Emoliev and Yuri Kaniovski (1987) and Paul David (1985, 1992) are particularly 
interesting, and probably the best known and noted. The simplest versions of these path- 
dependent models follow a somewhat different analytical strategy from those discussed in 
the previous section.] 
There, firms were considered explicitly. They were the "caniers" of technology, and 
the technology they used affected their "fitness." In the models considered in this section, 
firms tend to be repressed, and "technologies" per se are the units of analysis. In the 
former set of models the behavioral description tends to be quite articulated (obviously 
l a  Here we refer mainly to differences in the modelling philosophy rather than in the formal instr~ments  
utiized -- e.g., generalized Polya urns vs. ordinary differential equations, etc.: a discussion of the more 
technical aspects of different formal machineries is in Silverberg (19881, Rosser (1991) and Dosi and 
I(i?iovski (1993). 
involving also a few "inductive" generalizations on behavioral rules). The latter set, on the 
contrary, tends to focus on some general system properties while being rather agnostic on 
behavioral assumptions (see Foray's chapter in Foray and Freeman (1992)). The simplest 
version of the latter model basically works through the assumprion that each time one 
technology is used, or bought (and others not), the probability that it will be used or 
bought next time increases (and the other probabilities decrease). Under conditions of 
unbounded increasing returns it can be shown that one of the technologies ultimately 
drives out all its competitors with probability one. But the winning technology is (a) ex 
ante unpredictable, and (b) might not be the "potential best" of those that competed. 
Before discussing the various mechanisms that are argued to lie behind dynamic 
increasing returns, let us highlight why these analytic arguments are not simply interesting, 
but provocative. Let us consider the relationship between evolutionary success, intrinsic 
"fitness," and chance (i.e., unpredictable historical events) in the development and diffusion 
of innovations. 
Students of technical advance long have noted that, in the early stages of a 
technology's history, there usually are a number of competing variants. Thus in the early 
history of automobiles, some models were powered by gasoline fuelled internal combustion 
engines, some by steam engines, some by batteries. As we know, gradually gasoline fuelled 
engines came to dominate and the other two possibilities were abandoned. The srandard 
explanation for this, and it is a quite plausible one, is that gasoline engines were the 
superior mode, at that time, and with experience that was found out. The Silverberg-Dosi- 
Orsenigo model contains a variant of this mechanism. In their analysis a potentially 
superior new alternative requires some development -- learning -- before its latent 
superiority becomes manifest. It can take time before that development occurs and, with 
bad luck, it even is possible that it never occurs. However, one could argue, on the 
grounds of that model, that given sufficient heterogeneity among adopters (and thus also 
in expectations, initial skills, etc.) the potentially better technology is likely to win out, 
albeit at  the cost of many "microeconomic tragedies" (unfulfilled expectations, mistakes that 
nonetheless produce system-level externalities, death of firms, etc.). 
In the Arthur and David models, one can see a different explanation for why the 
internal combustion engine won out. It need not have been innately superior. All that 
would have been required was that, because of a run of luck, it became heavily used or 
bought, and this started a rolling snowball mechanism. 
What might lie behind an increasing returns rolling snowball? Arthur, David, and 
other authors suggest several different possibilities. 
One of them is that the competing technologies involved are what Nelson and 
Winter (1982), Dosi (1988) and others have called cumulative technologies. In a 
cumulative technology, today's technical advances build from and improve upon the 
technology that was available at the start of the period, and tomorrow's in turn builds on 
today's. The cumulative effect is like the technology specific learning in the Silverberg et 
al. model. 
Thus let us return to the history of automobile engine technology. According to the 
cumulative technology theory, in the early history of automobiles, gasoline engines, steam 
engines, and electrical engines, all were plausible alternative technologies for poxvering 
cars, and it was not clear which of these means would turn out to be superior. Reflecting 
this uncertainty, different inventors tended to make different bets, some working on 
internal combustion engines, others on steam en,gines, still others on electric polver. 
Assume, however, that simply as a matter of chance, a large share of these efforts just 
happened to focus on one of the variants -- the internal combustion engine -- and, as a 
result, over this period there was much more overall improvement in the design of internal 
combustion engines than in the design of the two alternative power sources. Alternatively, 
assume that while the distribution of inventive efforts were relatively even across the rhree 
alternatives, simply as a matter of chance significantly greater advances were made internal 
combustion engines than on the other alternatives. 
But then, at the end of the first period, if there tvere a rough tie before, gasoline 
powered engines now are better than steam or electric engines. Cars embodying internal 
combustion engines will sell better. More inventors thinking about where to allocate their 
efforts now will be deterred from allocating their attention to steam or electric engines 
because large advances in these need to be achieved before they would become competitive 
everL with existing internal combustion engines. Thus there are strong incentives for the 
allocation of inventive efforts to be shifted toward the variant of the technology that had 
been advancing most rapidly. The process is cumulative. The consequences of increased 
investment in advancing internal combustion engines, and diminished investment in 
advancing the other two power forms, are likely to be that internal combustion engine 
pulls even farther ahead. Relatively shortly, a clear dominant technology has emerged. 
And all the efforts to advance technology further in this broad area come to be 
concentrated on further improving it. 
There are nvo dynamic increasing returns stories that have been put forth. One 
stresses network externalities or other advantages to consumers or users if what different 
individuals buy are similar, or compatible, which lends advantage to a variant that just 
happened to attract a number of customers early. The other stresses systems aspects ~vhere 
a particular product has a specialized complementary product or service, whose 
development lends that variant special advantages. Telephone and computer networks, in 
which each user is strongly interested in having other users have compatible products, are 
commonly employed examples of the first case. Video cassette recorders which run 
cassettes that need to be specially tailored to their particular design, or computers that 
require compatible programs, are often used examples of the second. Paul David's story 
(1985) of the reasons why the seemingly inefficient "QWERTY" typewriter keyboard 
arrangement has persisted so long as a standard involves both its familiarity to experienced 
typists and the existence of typewriter training programs that teach QWERTY. 
As in the QWERTY story, the factors leading to increasing returns often are 
intertwined, and also linked with the processes involved in the development of cumulative 
technologies. Thus, to return to our automobile example, people who learned to drive in 
their parents' or friends' car powered by an internal combustion engine naturally were 
attracted to gas powered cars when they themselves came to purchase one, since they 
knew how they worked. At the same time the ascendancy of automobiles powered by gas 
burning internal combustion en,hes made it profitable for petroleum companies to locate 
gasoline stations at convenient places along highways. It also made it profitable for them 
to search for more sources of petroleum, and to develop technologies that reduced gasoline 
production costs. In turn, this increased the attractiveness of gasoline powered cars to car 
drivers and buyers. 
Note that, for those who consider gas engine automobiles, large petroleum 
companies, and the dependence of a large share of the nation's transportation on 
petroleum, a complex that spells trouble, the story spun out above indicates that "it did not 
have to be this way." If the role of the die early in the history of automobiles had come 
out another way, we might today have had steam or electric cars. A similar argument 
recently has been made about the victory of A.C. over D.C. as the "system" for carrying 
electricity. The story also invites consideration of possibly biased professional judgments 
and social or political factors as major elements in the shaping of long run economic 
trends. After all, in these stories all it takes may be just a little push. 
On the other hand, other analysts may see the above account as overblown. Steam 
and battery powered car engines had major limitations then and still do now; gasoline 
clearly was better. A.C. had major advantages over D.C., and still does. According to this 
point of view, dynamic increasing returns is an important phenomenon, but it is unlikely 
that it has greatly influenced which technology won out, in most important cases. Indeed, 
the relative importance of unique historical circumstances in determining long-term 
evolution is likely to remain a lively topic of empirical research and argument over the 
corning years. This is by no means restricted to technological change. It applies as well 
to fields like the development of particular institutions, the growth of f m  or the dynamics 
of financial markets.19 
V. Conclusions 
In this chapter we have attempted to present the major distinguishing features of 
evolutionary models in general, and, with much more detail, in economics. The c~arnples 
of applications that we presented are only a small subset of the potential research agenda 
that one is only be,ginning to explore, both via computer-implemented simulation models 
and via "reduced form" models that have become increasingly amenable to analytical 
treatments due to the advance in non-linear dynamics and system theory. And, of course, 
complementary to the theoretical endeavors there is a rich empirical agenda concerning the 
identification of the reclanties in economic structures and in the processes of change 
which are the natural objects of evolutionary explanations. Particularly promising areas 
of application of evolutionary models include the nature of learning processes; the 
mechanisms of adaptation, discovery and selection underlying economic growth; the 
theory of the firm and the dynamics of industrial organization. 
l9 In these other domains see for example Kuran (1991), Kirman (1991), Dosi and Kaniovski (1993;. 
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